Article 1593 of news.answers: Xref: ms talk.abortion:61945 news.answers:1593 Path: ms!darwin.sura.net!mips!spool.mu.edu!caen!nic.umass.edu!nic.umass.edu!ejones From: ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu Newsgroups: talk.abortion,news.answers Subject: talk.abortion FAQ 1/3 [Q & A] Message-ID: Date: 12 Jun 92 16:29:02 GMT Article-I.D.: umassmed.EJONES.92Jun12112902 Expires: Wed, 1 Jul 1992 00:00:00 GMT Sender: usenet@nic.umass.edu (USENET News System) Reply-To: ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu Followup-To: poster Organization: University of Massachusetts Medical Center; Worcester, MA 01655 Lines: 605 Approved: news-answers-request@MIT.Edu Nntp-Posting-Host: umassmed.ummed.edu Archive-name: abortion/part1 Last-modified: June 13, 1992 *(Note: Diff markers (*) have been added to make scanning this document *much easier for those who have seen it before.) In an attempt to make a fair FAQ for this group, I've come up with the following document. I hope you'll find the FAQ fair and impartial, without any references to actions on one side that don't include a similar action on the other side. This FAQ is updated every month, and I continue to read any and all comments sent to me. Make your comments to me as specific as possible, even to the point of writing whole paragraphs tha you would like to see in there. I would like to make this FAQ a true group FAQ, with contributions from as many people as possible. Please note this is the first of three documents. The second document is a list of relevant texts and information that people often ask for on talk.abortion. The third document contains relevant Supreme Court decisions. All three of these will always be posted at the same time, on the first and fifteenth of each month. In addition, the FAQ is by no means an attempt by me or anyone else to restrict or censor the posts of other people. This first document is only meant to be helpful, not 1984-ish. Also, a word of caution: This is *not* an official FAQ. There is no such thing as an official FAQ for a talk.* group. Many of the things contained in the first of the three documents are opinion only - not necessarily my opinion, but opinion nonetheless. Please do not use this FAQ as official doctrine. Use it only as the helpful guide it is meant to be. Thank you to everyone who helped create this FAQ. I sincerely appreciate the time and effort that you all put in on it. Erik Jones ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu ***************************************************************************** FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON TALK.ABORTION DOCUMENT ONE (OF THREE): QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TABLE OF CONTENTS ----------------- I. WHAT IS TALK.ABORTION? II. WHAT GROUPS ARE REPRESENTED ON TALK.ABORTION? III. WHAT IS THE SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO? IV. WHAT IF I HAVE A DISAGREEMENT WITH THE NAMES OF SOME OF THE GROUPS? V. ARE ALL PRO-[LIFERS/CHOICERS] ...? VI. IS THERE A LOT OF FLAMING? VII. HOW SHOULD I INTRODUCE MYSELF? VIII. IF I DON'T WANT TO POST PUBLICLY, IS IT OK TO RESPOND BY PRIVATE E-MAIL? IX. WHAT IF I HAVE SOME STATISTICS I WANT TO POST? X. MAY I USE TALK.ABORTION TO ANNOUNCE MARCHES AND RALLIES? XI. WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN SOMEONE WRITES...? XII. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE COMMON DISCUSSION THREADS? ------------------------- I. WHAT IS TALK.ABORTION? talk.abortion is an unmoderated newsgroup where people discuss abortion. All facets of abortion are discussed: Is abortion moral or immoral? What are the current laws and court cases in the country? When does a foetus become a person? Does a foetus have a soul? The conversation also tends to stray into other related topics, such as the rights of the father if a woman wants or does not want an abortion, the morality of certain types of birth con- trol, the process by which certain religious groups have come to their stance on abortion, the rightness or wrongness of the tactics of such groups as the National Right-to-Life Committee, NARAL, etc. Rights of the father tends to be more a discussion of alt.abortion.inequity, but it certainly does arise here at times. There are no limits placed on what may be discussed, since talk.abortion is an unmoderated newsgroup. II. WHAT GROUPS ARE REPRESENTED ON TALK.ABORTION? Just about every group you can imagine is represented. Of course there are the two major sides, pro-life and pro-choice. (Please read section IV, NAMES OF GROUPS.) There are also an infinite variety of opinions within those two groups. There are those who feel any abortion is wrong, be it to save the life of the mother, or to abort a foetus who has been conceived due to rape or incest. There are those who believe that abortions should be allowed at any time during the woman's pregnancy, on demand. There are those who believe that, while a foetus is truly a person, it is still the woman's choice to decide. There are those who believe that abortions should only be performed if the mother's life is in danger or if the woman has been raped. You'll find that no two people have exactly the same opinions, and that it is impossible to lump any person or group of people into one specific category. III. WHAT IS THE SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO? Rather poor. Most people seem to agree that one has to wade through a lot of posts written out of pure emotion to find those which have been carefully thought out. On a topic like this, which is so sensitive, most people do tend to get emotional once in a while. However, some of the best posts can be born out of raw emotion. If you are willing to take the time, you will find some great conversations underneath the surface, but it will take some digging. talk.abortion can range anywhere from 50 to 250 posts in one 24-hour period. IV. WHAT IF I HAVE A DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME OF THE NAMES OF THE GROUPS? Quite frequently, an argument springs up on talk.abortion about the names of the various groups. It usually tends to run along the lines of, "You're not pro-life, you're ANTI- CHOICE!" or, "You're not pro-choice, you're PRO-DEATH!" It seems to be fruitless to attempt to convince someone on the other side of the issue that their chosen label (pro-life, pro-choice, etc.) does not accurately describe their posi- tion. Such attempts commonly degenerate into name calling. If you are more interested in debating issues rather than engaging in flamewars, it is usually best to refer to the other person's position by the label that they have chosen. Since it seems as if the majority of people who oppose legal abortion choose to call themselves pro-life, and the majority of people who support legal abortion choose to call them- selves pro-choice, those labels are used in this FAQ. It is not safe to assume that either label applies to any given writer, however. At least one participant in talk.abortion prefers "pro-abortion," rather than "pro-choice." V. ARE ALL PRO-LIFERS CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS OR CATHOLICS? ARE ALL PRO-CHOICERS PAGANS? ARE ALL PRO-CHOICERS WOMEN? ARE ALL PRO-LIFERS MEN? ARE ALL PRO-LIFERS VIRGINS? ARE ALL PRO-CHOICERS IMMORAL AND PROMISCUOUS? No, no, no, no, no, and no. As was stated above, one can not lump anyone from either side into any category. Over the time that talk.abortion has been in existence, it has seen every type of person post. Gross generalizations will tend to get the poster in some very hot water. This is not an attempt to censor posting, but rather a reminder how things like this tend to move us away from the issues at hand. VI. IS THERE A LOT OF FLAMING? Yes, an extraordinary amount. Emotions run high with this issue anyway, and of course the people who will take the time to post to talk.abortion are those who are going to feel the strongest about the issue. There are two times when people tend to flame the most: a) When they are backed into a corner. If someone has trapped another person in an argument, that's when the flames tend to start from the person who has been backed in. b) When a person makes a blatant statement without any proof, i.e. "You're wrong and that's that!" "Abortion is murder, plain and simple!" "All pro-lifers are anti- women!" When a person says something like this, duck for cover, because they are likely to get flamed rather badly. Unfortunately, (b) often tends to happen because (a) happens. Needless to say, it is best not to flame, because it affects the signal-to-noise ratio and makes talk.abortion harder to read. The truth is, though, that we all tend to flame at times, and we will all get flamed at some point, so we do the best we can not to let it get to us. By the way, it's useless to write, "Don't flame me for saying this..." in your post. It won't stop any- one from flaming you. If you do not want to get flamed, don't post to talk.abortion. VII. HOW SHOULD I INTRODUCE MYSELF? There are three approaches that are commonly used, which can be listed for you here: a) Post a short biography of yourself, stating your position and why they feel that way in a nice, gentle, non-offensive manner. You are bound to get some friendly greetings from both sides of the issue if you do it this way. However, your post might also get lost in the high volume on talk.abortion. b) Slide right into the conversations at hand, which also works well, saving yourself from those embarrass- ing introductions. c) Post something with a subject header all in CAPITAL LETTERS where you say something along the lines of, "I AM APPALLED AT FOR BEING SUCH ABSO- LUTE YUTZES ON THIS ISSUE! ABORTION IS AND THERE'S NO DEBATE ABOUT IT! WHY DON'T ALL THE GO JUMP OFF A BUILDING AND MAKE THIS A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE!" Needless to say, this is probably not a good way to introduce yourself to talk.abortion. VIII. IF I DON'T WANT TO POST PUBLICLY, IS IT OK TO RESPOND BY PRIVATE E-MAIL? Yes, but I heartily recommend stating whether or not you would allow the person receiving the mail to post it to the Net if they so desire. (We've had many conversations on the issue of people doing just that in the past.) It will prevent future mis-understandings. There have been occasions where people on both sides have been harassed by people on the opposite sides of the issue by private e-mail. If this happens to you, promptly tell the person in private that you do not wish to receive any more mail from that person. If they persist, tell your system admini- strator about the problem. If the problem still persists and you want to take the matter public to the Net, realize you are stepping in some very hot water there. Some people feel adamantly about private e-mail never being posted (due to the fact it is private and it can also be easily forged) and some others feel it is the only way to stop harassment. This FAQ takes no sides on the issue. However, a warning is appropriate: If you do post private e-mail, prepare for some major flames. There have been a number of occasions of this happening in recent memory, and when the person posted the private e-mail, there was fierce discussion on the issue each time. If someone is harassing you publicly, you have no options but to ignore them or harass them back. There are a few people out there who have intense animosity towards specific people on the other side of the issue, and the language and flames between the two of them often gets intense. When harassment is public, at least you have other people on your side supporting you. IX. WHAT IF I HAVE SOME STATISTICS I WANT TO POST? DOCUMENT THEM! We have a major problem on talk.abortion with people posting statistics off the tops of their heads, and then not quoting the source. (After all, everybody knows that 63.7% of stats are made up.) If you post that the majority of people are pro-life, you are wrong. If you post that the majority of people are pro-choice, you are wrong. The only useful statistic is a documented statistic, not one created from something like, "Well, most of the people I know are , and and my rallies are bigger than the other side's, so the majority of people in this country must agree with me!" When you do document a statistic, it is best if you can also tell just how that statistic was reached. At the April pro- choice rally in Washington DC, there were people on the Net who said that there were 31,000 people there, and people who said that there were over one million people there. Those were from rough guesses. The official estimates ranged anywhere from 100,000 to 750,000+, all dependent on what source you looked at. Each group that tried to count did it in a different way, each with different ways in which their counting could have been high or low in comparison with the actual number. When one states just how the statistic was reached, that allows the people on talk.abortion themselves to decide the merit of the statistic. By the way, don't expect to convince many people on the other side, even with statistics. There are many people on both sides who claim that their group's rally in Washington DC was bigger, and nothing will convince either side otherwise. After all, a pro-choicer is much more likely to believe a statistic compiled by NOW, and a pro-lifer is much more likely to believe a sta- tistic compiled by Operation Rescue. In addition to all of this, you should probably try to post statistics in as fair a manner as possible. A statement like, "1.5 million children are murdered each year!" does nothing to help the discussion, especially if the people on the other side don't believe that it is murder. (See the definition of MURDER in the second of the three FAQ documents.) Instead, "1.5 mil- lion abortions are performed each year," is much more factual and gets right to the point of the issue. Likewise, an asser- tion, "Members of Operation Rescue bombed six abortion clinics last year!" is invalid. Six clinics might have been bombed, but to say that members of Operation Rescue did it is unwarranted, unless it has been proved in a court of law. X. MAY I USE TALK.ABORTION TO ANNOUNCE MARCHES AND RALLIES? Absolutely. talk.abortion may be considered a public service, so feel free to post information on anything you choose, in- cluding the following: - how a person may obtain an abortion - where a person might go to get abortion counseling - where a person who chooses not to have an abortion might go for advice an support - the various options available to people seeking abortions - information on the work of such organizations as Planned Parenthood, Birthright, NARAL, NOW, Operation Rescue, etc. - when rallies/parades/marches/protests/blockades are going to take place, regardless of how the other side feels about the fact these are taking place - texts of recent laws and court decisions affecting abortion - how certain politicians feel about the issue (document it...) - upcoming movies/documentaries/television shows about abortion - movements to pass a bill, stop a bill, etc. talk.abortion should be considered an information source for people on both sides of the issue, especially for the first four categories listed. As debaters, we tend to forget that there might be people pregnant, scared, and in need of help, with talk.abortion as their only source for information. It might also be a much healthier forum for debate if both sides engaged in more of this. XI. WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN SOMEONE WRITES: a) z/e/f? z/e/f is short for zygote/embryo/foetus. It is a term often used by people on the pro-choice side. While a pro-lifer will call it a baby or a child, a pro-choice person does not wish to give that kind of attribution. However, the unborn is not always a foetus, either, when speaking in medically correct terminology. Therefore, this term covers all the bases. b) TBA? TbBA? TBA is not To Be Announced, it stands for Truth by Blatant Assertion. It is an acronym used commonly by both sides. If a person does not have a logical or rational argument, they will often say something along the lines of, "Well, it is/isn't murder because I say so and that's that!" This is Truth by Blatant Assertion; the writer is hoping that if they say it vehemently enough, everyone will see that they are right. This is not a good way to argue if one wants to do it with logic. c) NFP? * NFP stands for Natural Family Planning, which is popularly * known as the "rhythm method." It is a type of birth control * practiced by some Catholics and others. No artificial birth control is used. Rather, followers of NFP study the biological patterns of the woman to try to determine when she is fertile and when she is not. d) POV? Point of View. e) IMO? IMHO? IMNSHO? In My Opinion, In My Humble Opinion, and In My Not So Humble Opinion, respectively. f) WRT? "with respect to," or "with regard to." XII. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE COMMON DISCUSSION THREADS? Many thanks to Siren for sending me the original list of these threads. Not all of the information sent could be incorporated, but I hope this gives newcomers a sense of what is discussed here. - Absoluteness of Morality and Ethics This thread always seems to start with someone asking, "Is it right to abort a foetus?" It then continues on to debate the value of human life, and the importance of human life over other forms of life. This thread consists of some often interesting explanations of personal philosophy. - Adoption vs. Abortion Facts and myths about adoption, from both sides. Usually someone will state that adoption is the best answer to the whole debate about abortion. Others will then agree, and some will make a case that adoption is not always a better answer than abortion. - Bible Study Interesting insights into the tradition of Judeo-Christian religion. Much discussion about various Bible quotes and debate over whether the Bible prohibts abortion or tacitly condones it. - Birth Process This usually begins with one person stating that pregnancy is easy, and that it is not difficult at all for a woman to give birth. This is then countered/supported with the personal experiences of women who have gone through a pregnancy and possibly birth. This tends to be a very emotional issue, and it is advised that no one trivialize the difficulties involved in pregnancy. - Child Support A tangential issue best avoided by the weak of stomach including a tremendous amount of flames and name calling, as well as half- truths and lies from both sides. There are frequent calls to take this thread into alt.abortion.inequity. - Constitution A number of people on talk.abortion have great knowledge of the U.S. Constitution, and much debate goes on regarding the inter- pretation of the Constitution with regards to abortion. It should be reminded of people that t.a is an international forum, and U.S. laws do not apply to many readers of t.a. - Feminism and the Abortion Dilemma What is the role of modern feminism in the abortion debate? This discussion usually centers around the policies of groups such as NOW, Feminists for Life, and the policies of well-known feminists. - Fetal Development Facts about gestation and fetal development are discussed at length and their relevance to abortion expounded. The purpose of this thread is usually to determine when life actually begins, or if the unborn foetus is truly a separate organism from the mother or not. - Flaming There are many private flame wars going on in this newsgroup, most of which have nothing to do with abortion. You can usually recognize these by their bastardizations of other people's names in the subject header. - Hitler, Nazism, the Holocaust, and Abortion People battle valiantly against the verbicide of the word "Nazi" and others, and inaccurate analogies. This topic invariably degrades into both sides calling the other side "Nazi's." On the pro-life side of the argument, those who argue on this thread state that Hitler condoned abortions, the Nazi's practiced it, and therefore it is evil. On the pro-choice side, they claim that the pro-lifers are doing just what the Nazi's did, forcing other people to conform to their beliefs. Many comparisons are drawn between the Holocaust and abortion, drawing shock and out- rage from others. A word of warning: Don't trivialize this subject. There are many people who have been deeply touched and affected by these subjects, and for the sake of these people it is recommended that this thread be avoided by everyone. - Law and the Supreme Court Discussion: Roe v. Wade, the Gag Rule, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Freedom of Choice Bill, the Human Life Amendment, as well as miscellaneous laws in various states and in other countries, especially Ireland. - Life of the Mother Should abortions be allowed if the life of the mother is at stake? This often delves into the relative importance of a foetus versus that of a mature woman. This is also a topic which tends to explode when it reaches critical mass. - Parent Notification and Public Sex Education The ever-changing family in a tumultuous society. Should our sons and daughters be taught about sex, pregnancy, and abortion in the public schools? Should one, both, or none of the parents be notified if a young woman wants to have an abortion? What should the age cutoff be? This often strays from the topic, but holds many interesting points and concerns. - Population and Society The effect of abortion or lack thereof on the population of the world or the country. - Procreation and Contraception The purpose of sex and what this has to do with abortion. Usually framed with Biblical quotes and much flaming. Often debates the merits of NFP, and whether the Catholic Church condones or condemns NFP. - Rape and Incest Should exceptions be made for abortion in the case of rape or incest? Many people believe that it should; however, the official Catholic Church position is that this should not be an exception. Therefore, this issue tends to explode violently every time it arises. (Personal note: Rape is a very charged issue for many * people on talk.abortion. There are people on this discussion group who have been personally affected by rape. When discussing the issue, please try to be civil and considerate to those who have a greater stake in this issue than you or I.) - Responsibility to the Foetus A buzzword thread. Very little of substance ever comes through here. What responsibility does a woman and society as a whole have towards a foetus, and does that responsibility end after birth? - Rights of the Father A thread which is usually bumped over into alt.abortion.inequity. Should a woman have to notify the father about the abortion? Should the man have a say as to whether the woman should be able to abort the foetus or not? - Values and the Relativeness to Abortion. Wherein the concept of absolute rights of the woman and the foetus is fired on from a variety of approaches in an intriguing display. In closing, talk.abortion is a very volatile roller-coaster of a News- group. It has to be, with an issue this sensitive and this close to the heart. This FAQ is not an attempt to control posts. It is an attempt to give new readers a source of information that they can refer to in order to find out more about talk.abortion. Enjoy the heat. ****************************************************************************** The FAQ documents were written by: Erik R. Jones The following people contributed to these FAQ documents. I owe my thanks to each of them for their contributions, large or small. *Jim Ault - Address for Operation Rescue *E. Elizabeth Bartley - Information on common acronyms, statistics * and information on abortion and foetal * development Linda Birmingham - Some excellent opinions on the nature of FAQ's, helping me work on the tone of the documents Keith Cochran - Wrote a previous FAQ, which helped get this entire idea rolling; ideas for definitions Kevin Darcy - The text of Ohio v. Akron, and general editing comments Ray Fischer - Inspiration for splitting this up into three docs, as well as an acronym suggestion Susan Garvin - Suggesting the info on the groups and sending me said info, forwarding the Freedom of Choice Act to me, the text of Section IV of the first document, and keeping me honest through this whole process James Keegan - Many thoughtful comments regarding the tone of the FAQ, as well as thoughts about religion and the abortion debate Larry Margolis - General comments and definition ideas, plus the Roe v. Wade text Sarah McCabe - Inspiration for putting in some definitions, general editing *George F. McQuary - Thoughts on NFP Michael Moore - An acronym suggestion Kristy Patterson - The first one to give me the idea for adding in the Supreme Court decisions Don Porter - Terrific information on Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton, and Rust v. Sullivan, as well as forwarding me the text to the Human Rights Amendment, which was ori- ginally posted by Bill Overpeck. Nora Rivkas - Many thanks for your original comments, which were the original catalyst to get me working on this project Rocker - General editing comments Siren - A very informative and valuable FAQ, much of which was incorporated into this one, most notably the list of many of the subject threads ****************************************************************************** Article 1594 of news.answers: Xref: ms talk.abortion:61946 news.answers:1594 Path: ms!darwin.sura.net!mips!spool.mu.edu!caen!nic.umass.edu!nic.umass.edu!ejones From: ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu Newsgroups: talk.abortion,news.answers Subject: talk.abortion FAQ 2/3 [DATA/INFO] Message-ID: Date: 12 Jun 92 16:29:55 GMT Article-I.D.: umassmed.EJONES.92Jun12112955 Expires: Wed, 1 Jul 1992 00:00:00 GMT Sender: usenet@nic.umass.edu (USENET News System) Reply-To: ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu Followup-To: poster Organization: University of Massachusetts Medical Center; Worcester, MA 01655 Lines: 509 Approved: news-answers-request@MIT.Edu Nntp-Posting-Host: umassmed.ummed.edu Archive-name: abortion/part2 Last-modified: June 13, 1992 *(Note: Diff markers (*) have been added to make scanning this document *much easier for those who have seen it before.) In an attempt to make a fair FAQ for this group, I've come up with the following document. I hope you'll find the FAQ fair and impartial, without any references to actions on one side that don't include a similar action on the other side. This FAQ is updated every month, and I continue to read any and all comments sent to me. Make your comments to me as specific as possible, even to the point of writing whole paragraphs tha you would like to see in there. I would like to make this FAQ a true group FAQ, with contributions from as many people as possible. This is the second of the three documents, one that includes some of the relevant texts on talk.abortion. The first document is the FAQ itself. The third document is of relevant Supreme Court Decisions. All three documents will always be posted at the same time, on the first and fifteenth of each month. Thank you to everyone who helped create this FAQ. I sincerely appreciate the time and effort that you all put in on it. Erik Jones ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu ************************************************************************* FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON TALK.ABORTION DOCUMENT TWO (OF THREE): RELEVANT TEXTS *TABLE OF CONTENTS: *------------------ * *1) DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS * *2) COMMON GROUPS ACTIVE IN THE ABORTION ISSUE * *3) RELEVANT AMERICAN DOCUMENTS * *4) ABORTION STATISTICS DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS: To try to make everyone happy, I've used the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 8th edition. I've included only those sections of the definitions that I thought were relevant to the abortion discussion. If you think that another definition should be added from the COD, please let me know. Please remember that a person's personal definition of any of these terms may very well be different from the definition listed below. We should not seek to impose the definition from this one source upon anyone. This list is for reference only. By the way, this source was used because it was a handy online dictionary at info.rutgers.edu. - abortion 1. the expulsion of a foetus (naturally or esp. by medical induc- tion) from the womb before it is able to survive independently, esp. in the first 28 weeks of a human pregnancy - alive 1. living, not dead. 2. a. existing; continuing; in operation or action 3. lively, active 5. aware of; alert or responsive to - baby (n) 1. a very young child or infant, esp. one not yet able to walk 4. a. a young or newly born animal b. a thing that is small of its kind - death 1. the final cessation of vital functions in an organism; the ending of life 2. the event that terminates life - embryo 1. a. an unborn or unhatched offspring b. a human offspring in the first eight weeks from conception - foetus 1. an unborn or unhatched offspring of a mammal esp. a human one more than eight weeks after conception - kill 1. a. deprive of life or vitality; put to death; cause the death of b. cause or bring about death 2. destroy; put an end to - life 1. the condition which distinguishes active animals and plants from inorganic matter, including the capacity for growth, functional activity, and continual change preceding death. 2. a. living things and their activity b. human presence or activity 3. a. the period during which life lasts, or the period from birth to the present time or from the present time to death b. the duration of a thing's existence or of its ability to function 4. a. a person's state of existence as a living individual b. a living person - misogyny 1. the hatred of women - murder (n) 1. the unlawful premeditated killing of a human being by another - person 1. an individual human being 2. the living body of any human being - zygote 1. a cell formed by the union of two gametes COMMON GROUPS ACTIVE IN THE ABORTION ISSUE: Here are some names and addresses of some of the many organizations which are active in the abortion issue, as well as brief synopses of the groups. Corrections or additions may be sent to me. Many thanks to Susan Garvin for compiling these and sending them my way. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |American Civil Liberties Union |American Life League | |132 W. 43rd St. |P.O. Box 1350 | |New York, NY 10036 |Stafford, VA 22554 | |(212) 944-9800 |(703) 659-4171 | | | | |Supports legal abortion |Opposes all abortion, including | |Opposes parental consent laws |to save the life of the mother | | |Headed by Judie Brown | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |Catholics for a Free Choice |Americans United for Life | |1436 U St. NW, Suite 301 |343 S. Dearborn St., Suite 1804 | |Washington, DC 20009 |Chicago, IL 60604 | *|(202) 986-6093 |(312) 786-9494 | | | | |Supports legal abortion |Opposes legal abortion | |Promotes family planning |Operates library and legal | |Headed by Frances Kissling |resource center | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |Christian Action Council |Feminists for Life of America | |101 W. Broad St., Suite 500 |811 E. 47th St. | |Falls Church, VA 22046 |Kansas City, MO 64110 | |(703) 237-2100 |(816) 753-2130 | | | | |Opposes legal abortion |Opposes legal abortion | |Sponsors Crisis Pregnancy Centers |Supports Human Life Amendment | |Spearheaded drive to end United Way |Supports Equal Rights Amendment | |funding for Planned Parenthood | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |Alan Guttmacher Institute |Human Life Foundation | |111 Fifth Ave. |150 E. 35th St. | |New York, NY 10003 |New York, NY 10016 | |(212) 254-5656 |(212) 685-5210 | | | | |Supports legal abortion |Opposes legal abortion | |Provides statistics on abortion |Provides financial support to groups| |and voluntary population control |which offer alternatives to abortion| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |National Abortion Federation |National Abortion Rights | |1436 U Street NW, Suite 103 | Action League (NARAL) | |Washington, DC 20009 |1101 14th Street NW | |(202) 667-5881 |Washington, DC 20005 | | |(202) 408-4600 | |Provides information to hospitals and | | |clinics that provide abortion services |Supports legal abortion | |Instructs women on how to choose an |Headed by Kate Michaelman | |abortion facility |One of the largest memberships of | | |lobbying groups for this purpose | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |National Organization for Women |National Right-to-Life Committee | |1000 16th St. NW, Suite 700 |419 Seventh St. NW, Suite 500 | |Washington, DC 20004 |Washington, DC 20004 | |(202)331-0066 |(202) 626-8800 | | | | |Supports legal abortion |Opposes legal abortion | |Headed by Patricia Ireland |Supports Human Life Amendment | |Supports Equal Rights Amendment |One of the largest memberships of | | |lobbying groups for this purpose | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |Operation Rescue National |Planned Parenthood Federation | *|P.O. Box 127 | of America | *|Summerville, SC 29484-0127 |810 Seventh Ave. | *|(803) 821-8441 |New York, NY 10019 | | |(212) 541-7800 | |Opposes legal abortion | | |Direct action group |Supports legal abortion | |Founded by Randall Terry |Provides contraception, abortion, | |Headed by Rev. Keith Tucci |and sterilization services | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |Pro-Life Action League |Sex Information and Educational | |6160 N. Cicero, Suite 210 | Council of the U.S. | |Chicago, IL 60646 |32 Washington Place | |(312)-777-2900 |New York, NY 10003 | | |(212) 673-3850 | |Lobbying and direct action group | | |Headed by Joseph Scheidler |Supports legal abortion | | |Clearinghouse for sex information | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ RELEVANT AMERICAN DOCUMENTS: Please remember that talk.abortion is, indeed, an international forum. The texts listed below have little or no bearing on the people of other countries. Supreme Court decisions are contained within the third part of the FAQ. - The 1st Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. - The 9th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. - The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Sections 1 and 5 Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. - The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America Unfortunately, the Declaration of Independence is not a legally binding document under any circumstances. Therefore, although many people cite it under many circumstances, I have chosen not to cite the document here. - The Freedom of Choice Bill To protect the reproductive rights of women, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Section 1. Short Title. This Act may be cited as the "Freedom of Choice Act of 1989". Section 2. Right to Choose. (a) In General. - Except as provided in subsection (b), a State may not restrict the right of a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy - (1) before fetal viability; or (2) at any time, if such termination is necessary to protect the life or health of the woman. (b) Medical Necessity Requirements. - A State may impose requirements medically necessary to protect the life or health of women referred to in subsection (a). Section 3. Definition of State. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each other territory or possession of the United States. - The Human Rights Amendment (This was drafted by James Bopp, General Counsel for the National Right to Life Committee.) Section 1: The right to life is the paramount and most fundamental right of a person. Section 2: With respect to the right to life guaranteed to persons by the fifth and fourteenth articles of amendment to the Constitution, the word "person" applies to all human beings, irrespective of age, health, function, or con- dition of dependency, including their unborn offspring at every stage of their biological development including fertilization. Section 3: No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any person: Provided, however, that nothing in this article shall prohibit a law allowing justification to be shown for only those medical procedures required to prevent the death of either the pregnant woman or her unborn off- spring as long as such law requires every reasonable effort to be made to preserve the life of each. Section 4: Congress and the several States shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. *ABORTION STATISTICS AND INFORMATION: * *- Abortion Statistics Chart * * From the 1990 World Almanac, thanks to E. Elizabeth Bartley. * * (Please note that all the percentage distributions exclude * the unknowns.) * *============================================================================ *| | 1972 | 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | *|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| *|Reported # of legal abortions | 586,760 | 988,267 | 1,297,606 | 1,328,570 | *|Ratio per 1000 live births | 180.1 | 312.0 | 359.2 | 353.8 | *|Rate per 1000 women aged | 13 | 21 | 25 | 24 | *| 15-44 years | | | | | *|==========================================================================| *| Age of woman (in years) | 1972 | 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | *|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| *|19 and under | 32.6% | 32.1% | 29.2% | 26.3% | *|20-24 | 32.5% | 33.3% | 35.5% | 34.7% | *|25 and over | 34.9% | 34.6% | 35.3% | 39.0% | *|==========================================================================| *| Race of woman | 1972 | 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | *|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| *|White | 77.0% | 66.6% | 69.6% | 66.6% | *|Black and other | 23.0% | 33.4% | 30.1% | 33.4% | *|==========================================================================| *| Marital status of woman | 1972 | 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | *|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| *|Married | 29.7% | 24.6% | 23.1% | 19.3% | *|Unmarried | 70.3% | 75.4% | 76.9% | 80.7% | *|==========================================================================| *| Weeks gestation at | | | | | *| time of abortion | 1972 | 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | *|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| *|8 and under | 34.0% | 47.0% | 51.7% | 50.8% | *|9-10 | 30.7% | 28.0% | 26.2% | 26.2% | *|11-12 | 17.5% | 14.4% | 12.2% | 12.3% | *|13-15 | 8.4% | 4.5% | 5.2% | 5.9% | *|16-20 | 8.2% | 5.1% | 3.9% | 3.9% | *|21 and over | 1.3% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.8% | *|==========================================================================| *| Type of procedure performed | 1972 | 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | *|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| *|Curettage | 88.6% | 92.8% | 95.5% | 97.8% | *| Suction | 65.2% | 82.6% | 89.8% | 92.9% | *| Sharp | 23.4% | 10.2% | 5.7% | 5.0% | *|Intrauterine instillation | 10.4% | 6.0% | 3.1% | 1.5% | *|Hysterotomy/hysterectomy | 0.6% | 0.2% | 0.1% | <0.05% | *|Other | 0.5% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 0.7% | *============================================================================ * * *- Fetal Development Chart * * (Many thanks to E. Elizabeth Bartley for forwarding this * text to me.) * * From: Clinical Embryology for Medical Students, Third Edition * by Richard S. Snell, M.D., Ph.D., pp. 70-75 *=========================================================================== *| Fetus | | | *| Age | Gross appearance | Nervous system | *|(weeks) | | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 1st | Fertilization | | *| | Cleavage of zygote | | *| | Blastocyst enters uterine | | *| | cavity | | *| | Trophoblast, inner cell mass | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 2nd | Zona pellucida disappears. | | *| | Blastocyst enlarges. | | *| | Implantation. | | *| | Syncytiotrophoblast and | | *| | cytotrophoblast formed. | | *| | Primary chorionic villi. | | *| | Formation of embryonic disk, | | *| | ectoderm, endoderm, amnion, | | *| | and yolk sac. | | *| | Extra-embryonic mesoderm. | | *| | Extra-embryonic coelom. | | *| | Primitive streak. | | *| | Mesoderm and notochord. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 3rd | Head and tail folds | Neural plate. | *| | | Neural folds. | *| | | Partial fusion of neural | *| | | folds. | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 4th | Body narrow and tubular; | Neural tube. | *| | C-shaped. | Three primary vesicles of | *| | Connection with yolk sac very | brain. | *| | narrowed; limb buds appear. | | *| | Placenta begins to form. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 5th | Head increases greatly in size. | Telencephalon. | *| | Face is forming. | Diencephalon. | *| | Limb buds show limb, forelimb, | Mesencephalon. | *| | hand, or foot. | Metencephalon. | *| | | Myelencephalon. | *| | | Cerebral hemisphere. | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 6th | Head dominant. | Flextures of brain obvious. | *| | Oral and nasal cavities | | *| | confluent | | *| | Curvature of embryo diminished. | | *| | Fingers and toes recognizable. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 8th | Head nearly as large as rest of | Rapid growth of central | *| | body. | nervous system. | *| | Facial features more distinct. | Expansion of fore-brain | *| | Eyes directed more anteriorly. | vesicle. | *| | Neck established. | | *| | Limbs more developed. | | *| | Digits of hands and feet | | *| | separated. | | *| | Fetus covered with epitrichium. | | *| | Retrogression of tail. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 12th | Rapid growth in fetal length. | Brain and spinal cord well | *| | Head still relatively large. | developed. | *| | Eyes look anteriorly. | Cauda equina. | *| | External ears on side of head. | Filum terminale. | *| | Eyelids fused. | | *| | Lanugo present. | | *| | Nails. | | *| | Sex recognition possible. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 16th | Further rapid growth in fetal | Cerebellum prominent. | *| | length. | Myelination begins in spinal| *| | Eyes widely separated but | cord. | *| | eyelids fused. | | *| | Auricles of ear high up on side | | *| | of head. | | *| | Fetus looks human. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 20th | Lanugo covers entire body. | | *| | Vernix caseosa present. | | *| | Hair present on head. | | *| | Mother detects quickening. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 24th | Skin wrinkled and red. | Myelination begins in brain.| *| | Head still relatively large. | | *| | Face child-like. | | *| | Eyebrows and eyelashes present. | | *| | Eyelids open. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 28th | Skin wrinkled. | | *| | Subcutaneous fat appearing. | | *| | Fetal contours more rounded. | | *| | Hair on head longer. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 32th | Fetus looks wrinkled and scraggy.| | *| | Lanugo hair has disappeared from | | *| | face. | | *| | Vernix caseosa thick. | | *| | Nails reach end of fingers. | | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 36th | Fetus looks plumper and rounder. | Cerebral fissures and | *| | | convolutions rapidly | *| | | developing. | *|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| *| 40th | Fetus fully developed. | Lower end of spinal cord L3.| *| | More subcutaneous fat present. | | *| | Lanugo hair disappear. | | *| | Nails project beyond ends of | | *| | fingers and toes. | | *=========================================================================== ****************************************************************************** Article 1595 of news.answers: Xref: ms talk.abortion:61947 news.answers:1595 Path: ms!darwin.sura.net!mips!spool.mu.edu!caen!nic.umass.edu!nic.umass.edu!ejones From: ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu Newsgroups: talk.abortion,news.answers Subject: talk.abortion FAQ 3/3 [DECISIONS] Message-ID: Date: 12 Jun 92 16:31:46 GMT Article-I.D.: umassmed.EJONES.92Jun12113146 Expires: Wed, 1 Jul 1992 00:00:00 GMT Sender: usenet@nic.umass.edu (USENET News System) Reply-To: ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu Followup-To: poster Organization: University of Massachusetts Medical Center; Worcester, MA 01655 Lines: 952 Approved: news-answers-request@MIT.Edu Nntp-Posting-Host: umassmed.ummed.edu Archive-name: abortion/part3 Last-modified: June 13, 1992 *(Note: Diff markers (*) have been added to make scanning this document *much easier for those who have seen it before.) In an attempt to make a fair FAQ for this group, I've come up with the following document. I hope you'll find the FAQ fair and impartial, without any references to actions on one side that don't include a similar action on the other side. This FAQ is updated every month, and I continue to read any and all comments sent to me. Make your comments to me as specific as possible, even to the point of writing whole paragraphs tha you would like to see in there. I would like to make this FAQ a true group FAQ, with contributions from as many people as possible. This is the third of the three documents, which contains texts of relevant Supreme Court decisions on abortion. The first document is the FAQ itself. The second document is of relevant texts regarding abortion. All three documents will always be posted at the same time, on the first and the fifteenth of each month. Thank you to everyone who helped create this FAQ. I sincerely appreciate the time and effort that you all put in on it. Erik Jones ejones@umassmed.ummed.edu ************************************************************************* FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON TALK.ABORTION DOCUMENT THREE (OF THREE): SUPREME COURT DECISIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS ----------------- 1 - The 1973 Roe v. Wade Decision Edited opinion of Justice Blackmun. 2 - The Doe v. Bolton Decision Summarized by Don Porter 3 - The 1991 Rust v. Sullivan Decision AKA The Gag Rule Synopsis from Project Hermes 4 - The 1990 Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Syllabus from the Reporter of Decisions --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE 1973 ROE V. WADE DECISION Please note that the Roe decision here is not complete. I have included what was sent to me, and I feel that the disadvantages of a larger document outweigh the advantages of including the full text of the Roe v. Wade decision. Many thanks to Don Porter, who forwarded the text as originally posted by Patt Haring. 410 U.S. 113; 93 S. Ct. 705; 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973) Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, saying: V. The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appel- lant would discover this right in the concept of personal "lib- erty" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its prenumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972); (White, J., con- curring); or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut (Goldberg, J., concur- ring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal abortion laws. VI. It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not of an- cient or even of common law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century.... It is... apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of out Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a preg- nancy that she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law con- tinued for sometime to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy... VII. Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the en- actment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th century and to jus- tify their continued existence. It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advance this justification in the present case, and it appears that no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously. The appellants and amici contend, moreover, that this is not a proper state purpose at all and sug- gest that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in pro- tecting it since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers. A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical pro- cedure. When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman. This was particularly true prior to the development of antisepsis Antiseptic techniques, of course, were based on discoveries by Lister, Pasteur, and oth- ers first announced in 1867, but were not generally accepted and employed until about the turn of the century. Abortion mortality was high. Even after 1900, and perhaps until as late as the devel- opment of antibiotics in the 1940's, standard modern techniques such as dilation and curettage were not nearly so safe as they are today. Thus it has been argued that a State's real concern in en- acting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy. Modern medical techniques have altered this situation. Appel- lants and various amici refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not without risk, is now relatively safe. Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth. Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous proce- dure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to forego it, has largely disappeared. Of course, important state interests in the area of health and medical standards do remain. The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in- sure maximum safety for the patient. This interest obviously ex- tends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of aftercare, and to ad- equate provision for any complication or emergency that might arise. The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather than weaken's, the State's interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are performed. Moreover, the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy contin- ues. Thus the State retains a definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy. The third reason is the State's interest -- some phrase it in terms of duty -- in protecting prenatal life. Some of the argument for this justification rests on the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of conception. The State's interest and general obligation to protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal life. Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate State interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as a least POTENTIAL life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone. Parties challenging state abortion laws have sharply disputed in some courts the contention that a purpose of these laws, when en- acted, was to protect prenatal life. Pointing to the absence of legislative history to support the contention, they claim that most state laws were designed solely to protect the woman. Because medical advances have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest. There is some scholarly support for this view of ori- ginal purpose. The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the State's interest in protecting the woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus. It is with these interests, and the weight to be attached to them, that this case is concerned. VIII. The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts the Court or individual Justices have indeed found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio (1968), Katz v. United States (1967)...; in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut (1965); in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut (1937), are included in this guar- antee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia (1967), procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), contra- ception, Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), family relationships, child rearing and education... This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four- teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court de- termined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of the rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diag- nosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or ad- ditional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the dis- tress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already un- able, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation. On the basis of elements such as these, appellants and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is en- titled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellants' arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no inter- est strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, is unpersuasive. The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting poten- tial life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the fac- tors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right in- volved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell (1927) (sterilization). We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy in- cludes the abortion decision, but that this right is not un- qualified and must be considered against {important} state interests in regulation. Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest," Kramer v. Union Free School District (1969), Shapiro v. Thompson (1969),...and that legisla- tive enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the le- gitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)... We note that those federal and state courts that have recent- ly considered abortion law challenges have reached the same con- clusion... Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state's interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and parental life, become dominant. We agree with this approach. IX. The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his bur- den of demonstrating that the Texas statute's infringement upon Roe's rights was necessary to support a compelling state interest....Appellee argues that the State's determination to rec- ognize and protect prenatal life from and after conception consti- tutes a compelling state interest. As noted above, we do not agree fully with either formulation. A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amend- ment. In support of this they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of per- sonhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, col- lapses, for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed spe- cifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in the United States." The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution....But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assur- ance, that it has any possible prenatal application. All this, together with our observation, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion prac- tices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not in- clude the unborn.... Indeed, our decision in United States v. Vuitch (1971) inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus...The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procre- ation, or education, with which Eisenstadt, Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, Pierce, and Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly. Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the dif- ficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the re- spective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are un- able to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question. There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. It appears to be the predominant, though not unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family. As we have noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception or upon live birth or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable," that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artifical aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks... In areas other than criminal abortion the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. ... In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. X. In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an im- portant and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and treat- ment there, and that it has still ANOTHER important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These in- terests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes "compelling." With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the compelling point, in light of the present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now established medical fact, referred to above...that until the end of the first trimes- ter mortality in abortion is less than mortality in normal child- birth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to per- form the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the fa- cility; and the like. This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of preg- nancy prior to this "compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that in his medical judgment the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of mean- ingful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Measured against these standards, the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abor- tions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the le- gal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, can- not survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.... To summarize and repeat: 1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excerpts from criminality only a *life saving* procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. (c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 2. The State may define the term "physician," as it has been employed [here], to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. The decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions on abortion are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intraprofessional, are available. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The justices in the Roe vs Wade decision: Voting for Roe (7): Name Term President ---- ---- --------- William O. Douglass 1939-75 Roosevelt William J. Brennan 1956-90 Eisenhower Potter Stewart 1958-81 Eisenhower Thurgood Marshal 1967-91 Johnson Warren E. Burger 1969-86 Nixon Harry A. Blackmun 1970- Nixon Lewis F. Powell Jr 1972-87 Nixon Voting against Roe (2): Byron R. White 1962- Kennedy William H. Renquist 1972- Nixon Other Notes: Burger was the Chief Justice. Blackmun wrote the majority decision. ---------------------------------------------------------- DOE v. BOLTON (Summary written by Don Porter) The citation is either 410 US 179 or 93 S. Ct. 739 for those who want to look it up for themselves. Most of the controversy seems to center around this paragraph: "We agree with the District Court, 319 F. Supp., at 1058, that the medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors -- physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age -- relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical judgment. And it is room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman." THE LAW IN QUESTION: A section of the Georgia Criminal Code (AARGH, I forgot to write down the section number -- sorry.) adopted in 1968 proscribed abortion except in cases where a licensed physician acting on his best medical judgment found that continuing pregnancy would endanger the woman's life, would injure her health, would likely result in the birth of a child with a grave, irremediable defect, or the pregnancy was a result of forcible or statutory rape. The law required that the woman in question be a Georgia resident. Further, it contained three specific procedural requirements: 1) The abortion must be performed in a state-accredited hospital. 2) The abortion must be approved by the hospital's abortion committee. 3) The attending physician's medical judgment must be confirmed by independent examinations of the patient by at least two other physicians. Prior to 1968, Georgia law prohibited all abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother. When defending the statute in District Court, Georgia officials claimed that the State interest in the new law was the same as in the old -- the health and welfare of women who might seek an abortion. THE WOMAN WHO BROUGHT THE CASE TO COURT: The appellant "Mary Doe" was a 22 year-old Georgia resident, married, with three living children. Two of these children were in foster care; the youngest had been placed for adoption. Her husband had abandoned her, leaving her to live with her indigent parents and their eight children. She and her husband had recently reconciled. He was sporadically employed in construction. She had been a patient in the State mental hospital. She had been informed that an abortion would represent less risk to her health than carrying the pregnancy to term, and she was unable to care for a child. Doe applied for abortion approval on March 25, 1970. Her application was denied on April 10, 1970, on the grounds that she did not meet the requirements of the statute. At the time of this denial, Doe was eight weeks pregnant. On April 16, 1970, she sought relief in the courts. DOE'S ARGUMENTS: Doe argued that the requirement that a physician use "his best medical judgment" was unconstitutionally vague since it gave the physician no clear indication of what acts would be violations of the statute. Doe further argued that her own privacy rights were being violated by the statute, citing Griswold v. Connecticut as precedent. The District Court ruled in Doe's favor and struck down parts of the law (I didn't write down the details of which parts.) Doe wanted further relief, and appealed to the Supreme Court. WHAT THE SC DECISION RULED: The "best medical judgment...would injure health" language is acceptable. It is not unconstitutionally vague. Physicians are professionals trained to make medical judgments concerning the health of their patients. The language means exactly what it says, and physicians are specially trained to know what "would injure health" and what constitutes sound medical judgment. (It is here in the decision that the "controversial" paragraph appears. The opinion in the controversial paragraph was also in the District Court decision. The Supreme Court was just agreeing here with the decision of the lower court.) The three specific procedural requirements are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, read in the light of Roe v. Wade's precedent that the right to an abortion is fundamental, requiring a compelling state interest to justify regulation, and regulations narrowly tailored to serve only the compelling state interests. The procedural requirements did not pass these tests. The residency requirement is an unconstitutional violation of the Privileges and Immunities clause (either Article IV, Section 2, or 14th Amendment, Section 1 -- I'm not sure which.) SOME IMPRESSIONS: 1) The controversial paragraph seems to me to be more a statement about physicians' rights and privileges than about women's rights. 2) The combination of Georgia's claimed state interest -- protecting the health and welfare of women -- and the focus in the controversial paragraph on the benefit that physician freedom provides toward that interest makes me wonder how applicable this case truly is to the third trimester. The Roe v Wade decision found that the State may claim a compelling interest in the potential life of the fetus in the third trimester of pregnancy. Thus, in third trimester situations, Georgia could have claimed a second interest in the fetus in addition to their stated interest in the health of the mother. With this additional compelling state interest factored in, the broad interpretation of health in DvB might not be an appropriate balancing of all the interests and rights involved. On these grounds, I think DvB probably does not serve as a precedent for third trimester situations, particularly since it addressed a first trimester situation. Thus, I think that the claims of pro-life literature, though grounded in fact, may be an overextension of a precedent to cases where it may not apply. 1991 RUST v. SULLIVAN DECISION No. 89-1391. Argued October 30, 1990 -- Decided May 23, 1991 {1} SYNOPSIS: Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act specifies that none of the federal funds appropriated under the Act's Title X for family-planning services "shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." In 1988, respondent Secretary of Health and Human Services issued new regulations that, inter alia, prohibit Title X projects from engaging in counseling concerning, referrals for, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning, and require such projects to maintain an objective integrity and independence from the prohibited abortion activities by the use of separate facilities, personnel, and accounting records. Before the regulations could be applied, petitioners -- Title X grantees and doctors who supervise Title X funds -- filed suits, which were consolidated, challenging the regulations' facial validity and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent their implementation. In affirming the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary, the Court of Appeals held that the regulations were a permissible construction of the statute and consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments. Held: 1. The regulations are a permissible construction of Title X. Pp. 615. (a) Because MDRV 1008 is ambiguous in that it does not speak directly to the issues of abortion counseling, referral, and advocacy, or to "program integrity," the Secretary's construction must be accorded substantial deference as the interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute, and may not be disturbed as an abuse of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the statute's plain language and does not otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-844. Pp. 7-8. (b) Title X's broad language plainly allows the abortion counseling, referral, and advocacy regulations. Since the Title neither defines MDRV 1008's "method of family planning" phrase nor enumerates what types of medical and counseling services are entitled to funding, it cannot be said that the Secretary's construction of the MDRV 1008 prohibition to require a ban on such activities within Title X projects is impermissible. Moreover, since the legislative history is ambiguous as to Congress' intent on these issues, this Court will defer to the Secretary's expertise. Petitioners' contention, that the regulations are entitled to little or no deference because they reverse the Secretary's longstanding policy permitting nondirective counseling and referral for abortion, is rejected. Because an agency must be given ample latitude to adapt its rules to changing circumstances, a revised interpretation may deserve deference. The Secretary's change of interpretation is amply supported by a "reasoned analysis" indicating that the new regulations are more in keeping with the statute's original intent, are justified by client experience under the prior policy, and accord with a shift in attitude against the "elimination of unborn children by abortion." Pp. 8-11. (c) The regulations' "program integrity" requirements are not inconsistent with Title X's plain language. The Secretary's view, that the requirements are necessary to ensure that Title X grantees apply federal funds only to authorized purposes and avoid creating the appearance of governmental support for abortion-related activities, is not unreasonable in light of MDRV 1008's express prohibitory language and is entitled to deference. Petitioners' contention is unpersuasive that the requirements frustrate Congress' intent, clearly expressed in the Act and the legislative history, that Title X programs be an integral part of a broader, comprehensive, health-care system that envisions the efficient use of nonTitle X funds. The statements relied on are highly generalized and do not directly address the scope of MDRV 1008 and, therefore, cannot form the basis for enjoining the regulations. Indeed, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended that Title X funds be kept separate and distinct from abortion-related activities. Moreover, there is no need to invalidate the regulations in order to save the statute from unconstitutionality, since petitioners' constitutional arguments do not carry the day. Pp. 11-15. 2. The regulations do not violate the First Amendment free speech rights of private Title X fund recipients, their staffs, or their patients by impermissibly imposing viewpoint-discriminatory conditions on Government subsidies. There is no question but that MDRV 1008's prohibition is constitutional, since the Government may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds. Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 474. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of another. Similarly, in implementing the statutory prohibition by forbidding counseling, referral, and the provision of information regarding abortion as a method of family planning, the regulations simply ensure that appropriated funds are not used for activities, including speech, that are outside the federal program's scope. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Rag land, 481 U. S. 221, distinguished. Petitioners' view that if the Government chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous counterpart rights, has been soundly rejected. See, e. g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540. On their face, the regulations cannot be read, as petitioners contend, to bar abortion referral or counseling where a woman's life is placed in imminent peril by her pregnancy, since it does not seem that such counseling could be considered a "method of family planning" under MDRV 1008, and since provisions of the regulations themselves contemplate that a Title X project could engage in otherwise prohibited abortion-related activities in such circumstances. Nor can the regulations' restrictions on the subsidization of abortion-related speech be held to unconstitutionally condition the receipt of a benefit, Title X funding, on the relinquishment of a constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion advocacy and counseling. The regulations do not force the Title X grantee, or its employees, to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that such activities be kept separate and distinct from the activities of the Title X project. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 400; Regan, supra, at 546, distinguished. Although it could be argued that the traditional doctor-patient relationship should enjoy First Amendment protection from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the Government, cf., e. g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. ---, ---, that question need not be resolved here, since the Title X program regulations do not significantly impinge on the doctor-patient relationship. Pp. 15-24. 3. The regulations do not violate a woman's Fifth Amendment right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. The Government has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because it is constitutionally protected and may validly choose to allocate public funds for medical services relating to childbirth but not to abortion. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. ---, ---. That allocation places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman wishing to terminate her pregnancy and leaves her with the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at all. See, e. g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 315, 317; Webster, supra, at ---. Nor do the regulations place restrictions on the patient/doctor dialogue which violate a woman's right to make an informed and voluntary choice under Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, and Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747. Unlike the laws invalidated in those cases, which required all doctors to provide all pregnant patients contemplating abortion with specific antiabortion information, here, a doctor's ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive, abortion-related information remains unfettered outside the context of the Title X project. The fact that most Title X clients may be effectively precluded by indigency from seeing a health-care provider for abortion-related services does not affect the outcome here, since the financial constraints on such a woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions, but of her indigency. McRae, supra, at 316. Pp. 24-27. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined; in Part I of which O'Connor, J., joined; and in Parts II and III of which Stevens, J., joined. Stevens, J., and O'Connor, J., filed dissenting opinions. 1990 OHIO V. AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH ET AL. DECISION Many thanks to Kevin Darcy for forwarding this information to me. No. 88-805. Argued November 29, 1989--Decided June 25, 1990 As enacted, Ohio's Amended Substitute House Bill 319 (H. B. 319) makes it a crime for a physician or other person to perform an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated, minor woman, unless, inter alia, the physician provides timely notice to one of the minor's parents or a juvenile court issues an order authorizing the minor to consent. To obtain a judicial bypass of the notice requirement, the minor must present clear and convincing proof that she has sufficient maturity and information to make the abortion decision herself, that one of her parents has engaged in a pattern of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse against her, or that notice is not in her best interests. Among other things, H. B. 319 also allows the physician to give constructive notice if actual notice to the parent proves impossible ``after a reason- able effort''; requires the minor to file a bypass complaint in the juvenile court on prescribed forms; requires that court to appoint a guardian ad litem and an attorney for the minor if she has not retained counsel; mandates expedited bypass hearings and decisions in that court and expedited review by a court of ap- peals; provides constructive authorization for the minor to con- sent to the abortion if either court fails to act in a timely fashion; and specifies that both courts must maintain the minor's anonymity and the confidentiality of all papers. Shortly before H. B. 319's effective date, appellees--an abortion facility, one of its doctors, and an unmarried, unemancipated, minor woman seeking an abortion there--and others filed a facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality in the Federal District Court, which ultimately issued an injunction preventing H. B. 319's en- forcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that vari- ous of the statute's provisions were constitutionally defective. Held: The judgment is reversed. 854 F. 2d 852, reversed. JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, concluding that, on its face, H. B. 319 does not impose an undue, or otherwise unconstitutional, bur- den on a minor seeking an abortion. Pp. 4-14. 1. House Bill 319 accords with this Court's cases addressing the constitutionality of parental notice or consent statutes in the abortion context. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622; H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398; Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476; Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416. Pp. 4-11. (a) Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires parental notice statutes, as opposed to parental consent statutes, to con- tain judicial bypass procedures, H. B. 319's bypass procedure is sufficient because it meets the requirements identified in Dan- forth, Bellotti, Ashcroft, and Akron for the more intrusive con- sent statutes, particularly the four criteria set forth by the plurality in Bellotti, supra, at 643-644. First, the statute sa- tisfies the requirement that the minor be allowed to show the ma- turity to make her abortion decision without regard to her parents' wishes. Second, by requiring the juvenile court to au- thorize her consent upon determining that the abortion is in her best interests and in cases where she has shown a pattern of abuse, H. B. 319 satisfies the requirement that she be allowed to show that, even if she cannot make the decision by herself, the abortion would be in her best interests. Third, the requirement that a bypass procedure ensure the minor's anonymity is satis- fied, since H. B. 319 prohibits the juvenile court from notifying the parents that the complainant is pregnant and wants an abor- tion and requires both state courts to preserve her anonymity and the confidentiality of court papers, and since state law makes it a crime for any state employee to disclose documents not desig- nated as public records. Neither the mere possibility of unau- thorized, illegal disclosure by state employees nor the fact that the H. B. 319 complaint forms require the minor to provide iden- tifying information for administrative purposes is dispositive. Complete anonymity is not critical under this Court's decisions, and H. B. 319 takes reasonable steps to prevent the public from learning of the minor's identity. Fourth, H. B. 319's time lim- its on judicial action satisfy the requirement that a bypass pro- cedure be conducted with expedition. Even if, as appellees con- tend, the bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, in- cluding weekends and legal holidays, that possibility does not suffice to invalidate the statute on its face. See, e. g., Ash- croft, supra, at 477, n. 4, 491, n. 16. Pp. 5-9. (b) The Bellotti criteria need not be extended by imposing ap- pellees' suggested additional requirements on bypass procedures. First, H. B. 319 is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that its constructive authorization provisions do not require an affirmative order authorizing the physician to act in the event that either state court fails to act within the prescribed time limits. Absent a showing that those limits will be ignored, the State may expect that its judges will follow mandated procedural requirements. Moreover, Ashcroft, supra, at 479-480, n. 4, does not require constructive authorization provisions, which were ad- ded by Ohio out of an abundance of caution and concern for the minor's interests. Second, a bypass procedure such as Ohio's does not violate due process by placing the burden of proof on the issues of maturity or best interests on the minor or by re- quiring a heightened, clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. The plurality in Bellotti, supra, at 634, indicated that a State may require the minor to bear the burden of proof on these issues. Moreover, a State may require a heightened stan- dard of proof when, as here, the bypass procedure contemplates an ex parte proceeding at which no one opposes the minor's testimony and she is assisted by an attorney and a guardian ad litem. Third, H. B. 319's statutory scheme and the bypass complaint forms do not deny an unwary and unrepresented minor the opportun- ity to prove her case by requiring her to chose among three forms, the first of which relates only to maturity, the second to best interests, and the third to both. Even assuming some ini- tial confusion, it is unlikely that the Ohio courts will treat a minor's choice of forms without due care and understanding for her unrepresented status. Moreover, she does not make a binding election by her initial form choice, since H. B. 319 provides her with appointed counsel after filing the complaint and allows her to move to amend the pleadings. Pp. 9-11. 2. Even assuming that H. B. 319 gives a minor a substantive, state-law liberty or property right ``to avoid unnecessary or hostile parental involvement'' upon proof of maturity or best in- terests, the statute does not deprive her of this right without due process, since its confidentiality provisions, expedited pro- cedures, pleading form requirements, clear and convincing evi- dence standard, and constructive authorization provisions are valid on their face. Pp. 12-13. 3. House Bill 319 is not facially invalid simply because it re- quires parental notice to be given by the physician rather than by some other qualified person. Since the physician has a supe- rior ability to garner and use important medical and psychologi- cal data supplied by a parent upon receiving notice, a State may require the physician himself to take reasonable steps to notify the parent. See Matheson, supra, at 400, 411. In addition, the conversation with an experienced and detached physician may as- sist the parent in approaching the problem in a mature and bal- anced way and thereby enable him to provide better advice to the minor than would a conversation with a less experienced person. Any imposition on the physician's schedule is diminished by pro- visions allowing him to give notice by mail if he cannot reach the parent ``after a reasonable effort'' and to forgo notice in the event of certain emergencies, which provisions constitute an adequate recognition of his professional status. Akron, supra, at 446-449, distinguished. Pp. 13-14. JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded in Part V that H. B. 319 consti- tutes a rational way to further legitimate ends. A free and en- lightened society may decide that each of its members should at- tain a clearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound phi- losophic choices confronting a woman considering an abortion, which decision will affect her own destiny and dignity and the origins of the other human life within the embryo. It is both rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in most in- stances, the beginnings of that understanding will be within the family, which will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and mature. Pp. 14-15. JUSTICE STEVENS, agreeing that H. B. 319 is not unconstitution- al on its face, concluded that, in some of its applications, the one-parent notice requirement will not reasonably further the State's legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its minor citizens. The question whether the judicial bypass is so obviously inadequate for such exceptional situations that the en- tire statute should be invalidated must await the statute's im- plementation and the evaluation of the significance of its res- trictions in light of its administration. The State must provide an adequate mechanism for avoiding parental notification for cases in which the minor is mature or notice would not be in her best interests. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, 441, n. 31. Pp. 1-3. KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part V, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and SCALIA, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. ******************************************************************************